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Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A
Review and Critique∗
William C. Duncan∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Arrangements providing for employment and other social benefits based on “domestic partnership” status are becoming increasingly common in both the private and the public sectors. For example, the Human Rights Campaign reports that 3,572 private
companies, colleges, universities, and governments offer domestic
partnership benefits to their employees.1 Recently, the state legislature of California began to offer domestic partnership benefits to
partners of legislative employees.2 In 2000, an arbitrator in Connecticut ruled that the state had to offer health benefits for same-sex
partners of state employees.3 A number of countries and foreign jurisdictions have also created a special status for same-sex couples.
These countries include Brazil,4 Canada,5 Denmark,6 France,7 Ice

∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles on the Law of
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on February 1, 2001.
∗∗ Assistant Director, Marriage Law Project, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America. I am particularly grateful to Margaret Robertson and James Peters of
the BYU Law Review staff for their superb editorial comments on the article.
1. DARYL HERRSCHAFT & KIM I. MILLS, THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED AMERICANS 2000 8 (2000).
2. Capitol Workers Win New Benefit; Health Coverage Quietly Extended to Unmarried
Partners, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA), May 12, 1999, at A3.
3. Matthew Daly, Ruling Favors Same-Sex Couples, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 2,
2000, at A3.
4. Larry Rohter, Brazil Grants Rights to Same-Sex Pairs, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 11,
2000, at A26.
5. Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, Bill C-23, § 125 (2000).
6. The Danish Registered Partnership Act, Act No. 372 (1989).
7. Adam Sage, Teachers Fake Gay Love to Move Jobs, TIMES (London), May 25, 2000,
at 18.
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land,8 Norway,9 Sweden,10 Switzerland,11 New South Wales (Australia),12 and Aragon (Spain).13 Now, Germany and Hungary are also
considering creating a status for same-sex domestic partners.14
These laws are of increasing concern not only because of their
frequency, but also because of their attractiveness as a substitute for
recognition of same-sex “marriage.” Politicians may offer domestic
partnership benefits, or something similar, as a concession. This happened in Hawaii in 1997 when the state marriage amendment was
being considered in the legislature.15 Similarly, the Iowa marriage
recognition statute (providing that an out-of-state same-sex “marriage” would not be valid in Iowa) included a provision creating a
task force to report on the issue of domestic partners.16 Most conspicuously, the Vermont Legislature created the status of “civil unions” for same-sex couples17 after a Vermont Supreme Court decision mandated the provision of marriage benefits to same-sex couples
by the legislature and threatened to force recognition of same-sex
“marriage” if the legislature did not comply.18
Now the American Law Institute (“ALI”) has joined the fray by
endorsing a domestic partnership status.19
This paper will survey the domestic partnership laws of various
U.S. jurisdictions and will compare the ALI proposal with these laws.
It will also discuss the litigation surrounding these provisions and

8. Icelandic Confirmed Partnership Act, No. 87 (1996).
9. Norwegian Registered Partnerships Act, Act No. 40 (1993).
10. Swedish Registered Partnership Act, Act No. 1994:1117 (1994).
11. Partnerships Broadened in Switzerland, WASH. BLADE, Mar. 31, 2000.
12. New South Wales Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act (1999).
13. Domestic Partnerships Granted by Law in Aragon, at http://www.redestb.es/triangulo/leyarin.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2001).
14. German Lawmakers Move Toward Giving Legal Status to Gay Couples, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 11, 2000, at 8; Jana Pinterovc & Michele Legge, Gay Marriage Bill Likely to Win Approval, PRAGUE POST, March 17, 1999.
15. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning
and Constitutionality, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 27–30 (2000).
16. 1998 Ia. H.F. 382, § 4 (Apr. 15, 1998); see also David Orgon Coolidge & William
C. Duncan, Definition or Discrimination? State Marriage Recognition Statutes in the “Same-Sex
Marriage” Debate, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 13 (1998).
17. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1201 (2000).
18. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (1999).
19. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)].
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briefly comment on legal and policy implications of domestic partnership statutes.
II. STATE DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP PROVISIONS
Only three states—Hawaii, California, and Vermont—have domestic partnership statutes. The Hawaii law was adopted in 1997 as a
tradeoff for the passage of the Marriage Amendment, which would
have prevented the legalization of same-sex “marriage.”20 The Hawaii law provides a number of benefits to state employees and citizens, although its effect on private employers is limited. Its provisions include funeral leave for state employees, hospital visitation
rights, health insurance coverage for partners of state employees, and
the ability to claim an elective share of a partner’s estate.21 Hawaii’s
term for domestic partners is “reciprocal beneficiaries.” Reciprocal
beneficiaries must be eighteen years old, ineligible to marry, and
unmarried. They must sign a declaration of intent,22 which is filed
with the director of the state health department.23 Reciprocal beneficiary status can be ended by filing a declaration with the state health
department or by marriage.24 Notably, the Hawaii statute explicitly
includes relationships not involving sex or the same residence. While
the law was originally intended to cover private as well as public employers, private employers filed suit. The litigation settled with an
agreement that the law would only apply to a small number of private employers.25
The California law, enacted in 1999, creates a registry whereby
same-sex couples and couples over age sixty-two can register for the
right to hospital visitation and to appoint their partner a beneficiary
on their insurance.26
Vermont’s act creates “civil union” status.27 The law provides
that town and county clerks will begin to issue “certificates of civil
union” to same-sex couples who are not married or party to another
civil union and who are not related to each other within the degrees
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See Coolidge, supra note 15.
1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383.
Id. §§ 1–4.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-5 (2000).
Id. § 572C-7.
See Coolidge, supra note 15, at 274–75 n.246.
1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 588 (West).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2000).
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prohibited by the marriage laws.28 It also gives jurisdiction to the
family court over all cases based on the civil union law.29 The law
provides that parties to a civil union will “have all the same benefits,
protections and responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to
spouses in a marriage.”30 It also provides that the terms “spouse,”
“family,” and similar terms in the law will be construed to include
couples in a civil union, and outlines a list of twenty-four nonexclusive kinds of law that will now be applied to same-sex couples on the
same terms as married spouses.31 The law also contains a requirement
that
insurers shall provide dependent coverage to parties to a civil union
that is equivalent to that provided to married insureds. An individual or group health insurance policy which provides coverage for a
spouse or family member of the insured shall also provide the
equivalent coverage for a party to a civil union.32

The bill also creates a new status of “reciprocal beneficiaries,” defined as two people related by blood or adoption who want to enjoy
some benefits of marriage.33 Reciprocal beneficiaries are given rights
related to: (1) hospital visitation and medical decision-making;34 (2)
decision-making relating to anatomical gifts;35 (3) decision-making
relating to disposition of remains;36 (4) “[d]urable power of attorney
for health care”;37 (5) “[p]atient’s bill of rights”;38 (6) nursing home
patient’s bill of rights;39 and (7) abuse prevention.40
The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force indicates that Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Washington also provide for non-statutory benefits for domestic partners

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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Id. § 1203.
Id. § 1206.
Id. § 1204(a).
Id. § 1204(e).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4063(a) (2000).
Id. tit. 15, § 1303 (2000).
Id. tit. 18, § 1853 (2000).
Id. tit. 18, § 5240(a)(2).
Id. tit. 18, § 5220.
Id. tit. 14, § 3456 (2000).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1852 (2000).
Id. tit. 33, § 7301.
Id. tit. 15, § 1101 (2000).
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of public employees.41
III. MUNICIPAL DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP ORDINANCES
Some form of domestic partnership benefits is reportedly offered
to employees or residents of as many as seventy-four cities and counties.42 The first city to have offered such benefits was Berkeley, California, which did so in 1984.43 The ordinances creating municipal
benefits can vary widely but include a number of common elements.
This paper examines the ordinances or policies of thirty-five municipalities.44
A. Statement of Purpose
A number of municipalities include findings or a statement of
purpose in their domestic partnership laws.45 Several themes emerge
in these statements. First is a reference to domestic partnerships as a
different form of “family.” Ann Arbor’s statement of purpose says:
“Many persons today share a life as families in enduring and committed relationships apart from marriages. . . . The city of Ann Arbor has
an interest in strengthening and supporting all caring, committed
and responsible family forms.”46 Cambridge’s ordinance says: “The
City Council acknowledges that the people’s lives have evolved from
when laws governing family relationships were enacted. Perpetuation
of the traditional definitions of ‘family’ excludes a significant seg-

41. National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Domestic Partner Benefits for State Employees,
at http://www.ngltf.org/pi/dpbstatebr.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
42. See HERRSCHAFT & MILLS, supra note 1, at 9.
43. See Partners Task Force for Gay and Lesbian Couples, Governments Offering Benefits, at http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-gov.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2001).
44. These were the statutes available online. Some of the cities reported to have domestic partnership ordinances do not, in fact, have such laws.
45. ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE ch. 110, § 9:86 (2001); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-151 (1999); CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.010
(1992); IOWA CITY, IOWA, CODE ch. 6, § 2-6-1 (1994); ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 215-20
(2000); LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 2.210.010 (1999); MARIN COUNTY, CAL.,
CODE § 6.88.010 (1993); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.10 (1991);
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999); MULTNOMAH
COUNTY, OR., ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 (2000); PROVINCETOWN, MASS.,
GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-1 (1998); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 62.1 (1990); SANTA
BARBARA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 42-1 (2001); SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE §
4.60.010 (1995).
46. ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:86 (2000) (emphasis added).
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ment of the Cambridge population.”47 The notion of an expanding
understanding of family also appears in the Iowa City law: “The city
recognizes that nationwide debate has advanced an expanded concept of familial relationships beyond traditional marital and blood relationships. This expanded concept recognizes the relationship of
two (2) non-married but committed adult partners.”48 Ithaca’s ordinance expresses an interest in “strengthening and supporting all caring, committed and responsible family forms” and describes domestic partnership as “a relationship and family unit that is deserving of
official recognition.”49 Broward County’s findings include the contention that domestic partners “often live in a committed family relationship.”50 Santa Monica’s law says that “domestic partners live in
an intimate and committed family relationship.”51
Another common theme is diversity. The Ann Arbor language
indicates the city’s interest in “cultural diversity.”52 Diversity is also
invoked in the ordinances of Cambridge, Montgomery County, and
Provincetown.53
A few statements describe their purpose as involving concepts of
fairness or equal treatment with regard to marriage benefits. Iowa
City’s domestic partnership ordinance is typical: “It is appropriate
and fair that certain of the societal privileges and benefits now accorded to members of a marriage be extended to those who meet
the qualifications of a domestic partnership.”54 The Broward County
language is interesting:
Domestic partners are often denied public and private sector benefits because there is no established system for such relationships to
be registered and/or recognized. In addition, because of the status
of their relationship, domestic partners in many cases are not ex-

47. CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.010 (emphasis added). The Provincetown language is identical except for jurisdiction-specific references. PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BYLAWS § 7-1.
48. IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-1 (emphasis added). The same language is contained
in the Minneapolis ordinance. MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.10.
49. ITHACA CODE § 215-20(a) (emphasis added).
50. BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16 ½-151(a) (emphasis added).
51. SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.60.010 (1995) (emphasis added).
52. ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE ch. 110, § 9:86 (2000).
53. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.010 (1992); MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999); PROVINCETOWN, MASS., GENERAL BY-LAWS §
7-1 (1998).
54. IOWA CITY, IOWA, CODE ch. 6, § 2-6-1 (1994).
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tended certain employment benefits that are otherwise made available to other employees.55

Montgomery County’s language reads thus: “The County believes it is unfair to treat employees differently based solely on
whether the employee’s partner is legally recognized as a spouse.”56
Like Broward County, Santa Monica’s law emphasizes that unmarried couples “are often denied public and private sector benefits because no mechanism has been established for registering their
relationship.”57
Interestingly, many statutes focus on the purpose of providing
recognition or validation for unmarried couples. The Los Angeles
County ordinance includes this statement: “As domestic partnerships
have become more prevalent among individuals who reside or are
employed within the county, a corresponding need has arisen on the
part of persons in such relationships and on society’s part generally
for a means for such persons to give public notice of their relationships.”58 Similarly, the San Francisco ordinance states: “The purpose
of this ordinance is to create a way to recognize intimate committed
relationships, including those of lesbians and gay men who otherwise
are denied the right to identify the partners with whom they share their
lives.”59 Similar language is contained in the Marin County and Santa
Barbara ordinances.60 The Multnomah County statement of purpose
describes its domestic partnership registry as a “means by which unmarried, committed couples who share a life and home together may
document their relationship.”61 Some of the ordinances focus not
merely on recognition but on providing approbation to the relationship. For instance, the Ann Arbor ordinance indicates that its domestic partnership system provides “a mechanism for the public expression, sanction and documentation of the commitment reflected by
the domestic partnership.”62 Failing to give legal status, according to

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-151 (1999).
MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22.
SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.60.010 (1995).
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 2.210.010 (1999) (emphasis added).
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 62.1 (1990) (emphasis added).
MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 6.88.010 (1993); see also SANTA BARBARA
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 42-1 (2001) (using the exact same language as Los Angeles County).
61. MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OR., ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948, § 27.351
(2000).
62. ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE ch. 110, § 9:86 (2001).
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the Cambridge statement of purpose, “deprives [unmarried couples]
of recognition and validation.”63
Finally, a few of the laws describe benefits to the city or county
that will come from domestic partnership recognition. Broward
County’s ordinance says that “the provision of domestic partner
benefits promotes employee recruitment, employee retention, and
employee loyalty.”64 Montgomery County’s provision says: “Providing domestic partner benefits will significantly enhance the County’s
ability to recruit and retain highly qualified employees and will promote employee loyalty and workplace diversity.”65
B. Registration
All but one of the policies or ordinances require some form of
registration.66 Most merely require a statement, affidavit, or form to
be filed with the city or county clerk.67 A few require enrollment

63. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.010 (1992).
64. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-151 (1999).
65. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999).
66. Montgomery County allows for registration but also provides that a domestic partnership can be established by filling the legal requirements of the ordinance. See id.
67. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170 (2000); Albuquerque, N.M.,
Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures (on file with author); ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE ch.
110, § 9:88 (2001); ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-131 (2000); Berkeley, Cal.,
City
Clerk,
http://www.ci.berkeDomestic
Partnership
Information,
at
ley.ca.us/clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2001); BROWARD
COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153 (1999); CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE
§ 2.119.030 (1992); Town of Eastchester, N.Y., Town Board Minutes (Sept. 9, 2000) (on file
with author); IOWA CITY, IOWA, CODE ch. 6, § 2-6-3 (1994); ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 215-22
(2000); KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.32 (1998); KING COUNTY, WASH.,
CODE § 3.12.010 (1998); LAGUNA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 1.12.010 (1992); LOS
ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 2.210.020 (1999); MADISON, WIS., MUN. CODE §
3.23(10)(d) (1998); MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 6.88.030 (1993); MINNEAPOLIS,
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.30 (1991); MULTNOMAH COUNTY, MD., ADOPTED
DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352 (2000); NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODE § 3-241 (2000);
OAKLAND, CA., CODE § 4.20.050 (2000); Petaluma, Cal., City Council, Minutes of Regular
Meeting, at http://www.ci.petaluma.ca.us (last visited Jan. 4, 1999); PROVINCETOWN, MASS.,
GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-3-1 (1998); ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE § 47B-1 (2000);
SACRAMENTO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.120.020 (2000); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE
§ 62.3 (1990); SANTA BARBARA, CAL., COUNTY CODE § 42-2 (2001); SANTA MONICA, CAL.,
MUN. CODE § 4.60.030 (1995); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 4.30.020 (1989); Tempe,
Ariz., Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at http://www.tempe.gov (last visited
Mar. 9, 2001); City of Tumwater, Wash., Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at
http://www.oly-wa.net/tumwater (last visited Mar. 10, 2001); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL.,
MUN. CODE § 2.84.030 (1996).
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with the municipality’s human resource department.68 In Philadelphia, partners file an affidavit with the Commission on Human Relations.69 Two jurisdictions require that the parties sign their form in
the presence of the clerk.70 Three jurisdictions also issue certificates
to the parties after filing.71
C. Definition
The ways in which different jurisdictions define “domestic partners” are substantially uniform. The definitions generally include the
following:
• a requirement that the parties be at least 18 years old.72
• a specification that a domestic partnership involve only
two persons.73
68. City
of
Los
Angeles,
Cal.,
Domestic
Partner
Information,
at
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001); MONTGOMERY
COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (again, Montgomery County allows for registration
but does not require it); City of Northampton, Mass., Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us (last
visited Oct. 26, 2001); PIMA COUNTY, ARIZ., MERIT POLICIES § 7-106 (2000).
69. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 9-1106 (2000).
70. KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.32; MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.030.
71. MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.030; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.050; NEW
YORK CITY CODE § 3-244.
72. All but one of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN.
CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ANN ARBOR CODE
ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City Clerk, Domestic
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/
Partnership
Information,
at
domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153;
CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE §
215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010;
LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information,
at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; LOS ANGELES COUNTY CODE § 2.210.020;
MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020; MINNEAPOLIS CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 142.20; MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999);
MULTNOMAH COUNTY ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352; NEW YORK CITY
CODE § 3-241; City of Northampton, Mass., Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us (last visited
Oct. 26, 2001); OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE § 9-1106; ROCHESTER
CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE §
62.2; SANTA BARBARA COUNTY CODE § 42-2; SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 4.60.020;
SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 4.30.020; Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at
http://www.tempe.gov; City of Tumwater, Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at
http://www.olywa.net/tumwater; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010.
73. All but two of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL.,
ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170 (2000); Albuquerque Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures;
ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City
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a specification that neither party can be married.74
a requirement that the parties share joint responsibility
for expenses (sometimes phrased as sharing the “common necessities of life”).75

Clerk,
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/
Domestic
Partnership
Information,
at
clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½153; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE §
215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010;
LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information,
at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; LOS ANGELES COUNTY CODE § 2.210.020;
MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20;
MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; MULTNOMAH COUNTY ADOPTED
DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352; NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-241; City of Northampton, Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at
http://www.city.northampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE §
9-1106; PROVINCETOWN, MASS., GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1 (1998); ROCHESTER CODE §
47B-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.2; SANTA
BARBARA COUNTY CODE § 42-2; SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 4.60.020; SEATTLE MUN.
CODE § 4.30.020; City of Tumwater, Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at
http://www.olywa.net/tumwater; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010.
74. All but three of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY
ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque, Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ANN
ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-858; Berkeley, City
Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/
domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16 ½-153;
CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE §
215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; City of
Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm;
MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020; MINNEAPOLIS CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 142.20; MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22;
MULTNOMAH COUNTY ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352(2); NEW YORK CITY
CODE § 3-241; City of Northampton, Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—
Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city.north-ampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE §
4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE § 9-1106; PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1;
ROCHESTER CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN.
CODE § 62.2; SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 4.60.020; SEATTLE MUN. CODE §4.30.020;
Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at http://www.tempe.gov; City of
Tumwater,
Facts
About
Domestic
Partnership
Registration,
at
http://www.olywa.net/tumwater; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010. In Madison,
the parties can be married to each other. MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2).
75. All but six of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN.
CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque, Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ANN ARBOR CODE
ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City Clerk, Domestic
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/
Partnership
Information,
at
domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153; IOWA
CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE § 215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES §
72.31; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; City of
Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/
dppenfaq.htm; MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020; MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES §
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a provision that the parties not be related in a way that
would prevent them from being married in the state.76
Somewhat less common provisions include:
• a requirement that the parties live together.77
• a requirement that the parties be competent to consent
142.20; MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; MULTNOMAH COUNTY
ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352(1); City of Northampton, Human Resources
Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city.
northampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE § 9-1106;
PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1; ROCHESTER CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO
MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.2; SANTA MONICA MUN.
CODE § 4.60.020; SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 4.30.020; Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic
Partner Affidavit, at http://www.tempe.gov; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010.
76. All but five of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN.
CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque, Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ANN ARBOR CODE
ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City Clerk, Domestic
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/
Partnership
Information,
at
domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153;
CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE §
215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010;
LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; LOS ANGELES COUNTY CODE § 2.210.020; MARIN
COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020; MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20; MONTGOMERY
COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; MULTNOMAH COUNTY ADOPTED DOCUMENTS,
Ord. No. 948 § 27.352(4); NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-241; City of Northampton, Human
Resources Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at
http://www.city.northampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE §
9-1106; PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE §
2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.2; SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 4.60.020;
SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 4.30.020; Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at
http://www.tempe.gov; City of Tumwater, Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at
http://www.olywa.net/tumwater; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010. In two municipalities, the requirement is that the parties cannot be related “by blood.” BROWARD
COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153; City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm.
77. All but ten of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN.
CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque, Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ATLANTA CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, at
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/do-mesticaffidavitform.pdf;
CAM-BRIDGE
ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; ITHACA CODE § 215-21; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; City of
Los
Angeles,
http://www.lacity.org/
Domestic
Partner
Information,
at
PEN/dppenfaq.htm; MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020;
MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; MULTNOMAH COUNTY ADOPTED
DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352(1); NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-241; City of Northampton, Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit,
at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE
§ 9-1106; ROCHESTER CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN
FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.2; SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 4.60.020; SEATTLE MUN.
CODE § 4.30.020; Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at
http://www.tempe.gov.
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to the arrangement.78
Nearly every municipality with a domestic partnership law allows—either explicitly or implicitly by not specifying gender requirements of partners—both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to
register as domestic partners.79 Montgomery County and Philadelphia allow only same-sex couples to register.80
Three of the jurisdictions specify that there must be free consent
of the parties involved.81
Over half of the jurisdictions include some sort of requirement

78. All but eleven of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY
ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170; ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, at
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE
ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE § 215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING
COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; MADISON MUN.
CODE § 3.23(2); MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20; MONTGOMERY COUNTY
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; City of Northampton, Mass., Human Resources Department,
Domestic
Partners—Family
Health
Insurance
Benefit,
at
http://www.city.northampton.ma.us (last visited Oct. 26, 2001); OAKLAND CODE §
4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE § 9-1106; PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1;
ROCHESTER CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SEATTLE MUN. CODE
§ 4.30.020; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010.
79. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque Domestic Partners
Policies & Procedures; ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES
§
2-858;
Berkeley,
City
Clerk,
Domestic
Partnership
Information,
at
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE
ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE § 215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING
COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; City of Los Angeles,
Domestic Partner Information, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; LOS ANGELES
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 2.210.020 (1999); MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); MARIN
COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020; MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20; MULTNOMAH
COUNTY ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948; NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-241; City of
Northampton, Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance
Benefit, at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050;
PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1; ROCHESTER CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO
MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.2; SANTA BARBARA, CAL.,
COUNTY CODE § 42-2 (2001); SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.60.020 (1995);
SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 4.30.020; Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at
http://www.tempe.gov; City of Tumwater, Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at
http://www.oly-wa.net/tumwater; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010.
80. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; PHILADELPHIA CODE §
9-1106.
81. City
of
Los
Angeles,
Domestic
Partner
Information,
at
COUNTY
CODE
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm;
MONTGOMERY
OF
ORDINANCES § 33-22; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010.
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that the parties be engaged in an intimate relationship. This is generally designated as a relationship of “mutual support, caring and
commitment.”82 Another common description is a “close and committed personal relationship” or some variation of that theme.83 It is
not clear whether this “intimacy” requirement means a sexual
relationship, although that seems to be the implication. Some
describe the relationship by reference to marriage. For instance,
Albuquerque requires a “mutual commitment similar to marriage.”84
The requirement in Minneapolis is that the parties be “committed to
one another to the same extent as married persons are to each other,
except for the traditional marital status and solemnities.”85
Northampton requires an “exclusive mutual commitment similar to
that of marriage.”86 Los Angeles County’s law describes an “intimate
and committed relationship of mutual caring,”87 and Santa Monica’s
law is substantially the same.88 San Francisco’s law states that the
parties will have “chosen to share one another’s lives in an intimate
and committed relationship of mutual caring . . . .”89 Two cities
reference “family”: Cambridge requires that the parties “consider
themselves to be a family”;90 Key West is similar in requiring that the
partners “consider themselves to be members of each other’s
immediate family” and that they have “chosen to share one another’s
lives in a family relationship.”91 Madison’s description employs both
positive (“relationship is of a permanent and distinct domestic
character”) and negative (“not in a relationship that is merely
82. Albuquerque Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110,
§ 9:87; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA
CODE § 215-21; MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 72-1; City of Tumwater, Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at
http://www.olywa.net/tumwater.
83. ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010;
MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-241;
SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 4.30.020.
84. Albuquerque Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures.
85. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20 (1991).
86. City of Northampton, Mass., Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—
Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us (last visited Oct. 26,
2001).
87. City
of
Los
Angeles,
Cal.,
Domestic
Partner
Information,
at
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
88. SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.60.020 (1995).
89. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 62.2 (1990).
90. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.020 (1992).
91. KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31 (1998).
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negative (“not in a relationship that is merely temporary, social, political, commercial or economic in nature”) elements.92 Rochester
wants the partners to be “committed to the physical, emotional and
financial care and support of each other.”93
D. Benefits
A wide variety of benefits are available to domestic partners in
the various jurisdictions. Some provisions, however, are merely symbolic and do not provide the basis for any specific benefits. Five municipalities offer to domestic partners all of the benefits extended to
married spouses of public employees.94 Eleven provide health insurance coverage for partners of public employees.95 Eight allow partners to have hospital visitation,96 and five provide for visitation in
jails.97 Eight municipalities allow public employees to have sick or
bereavement leave on the illness or death of a partner or partner’s
family member.98 Provincetown and Cambridge allow for access to
92. MADISON, WIS., MUN. CODE § 3.23(2) (1998).
93. ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE § 47B-1 (2000).
94. Berkeley,
Cal., City
Clerk,
Domestic
Partnership
Information,
at
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf (last visited Sept. 19,
2001); CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.070; ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 215-27 (2000); KEY
WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.35; MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999).
95. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 3.64.030 (2000); Albuquerque, N.M.,
Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures (on file with author); ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 2-858 (2000); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-156
(1999); Town of Eastchester, N.Y., Town Board Minutes (Sept. 9, 2000) (on file with author); ITHACA CODE § 215-27; KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 3.12.040 (1998); City of Los
Angeles, Cal., Domestic Partner Information, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm
(last visited Mar. 9, 2001); City of Northampton, Mass., Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us
(last visited Oct. 26, 2001); PHILADELPHIA, PA., CITY CODE § 9-1106 (2000); PIMA
COUNTY, ARIZ., MERIT POLICIES § 7-106 (2000); Tempe, Ariz., Human Resources, Domestic
Partner Affidavit, at http://www.tempe.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
96. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.060 (1992); LAGUNA BEACH, CAL.,
MUN. CODE § 1.12.070 (1992); MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 6.88.070 (1993);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.70 (1991); NEW YORK CITY, N.Y.,
CODE § 3-244 (2000); PROVINCETOWN, MASS., GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-6-1 (1998);
SACRAMENTO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.120.080 (2000); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUN.
CODE § 2.84.070 (1998).
97. ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-135; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE §
2.119.060; LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.080; PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS §
7-6-2; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.080.
98. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.120; Albuquerque Domestic Partners
Policies & Procedures; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.070; LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL.,
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the school records of a partner’s child if the guardian partner has
written a letter to the school allowing such access.99 Oakland and
Philadelphia provide an exemption from taxes on property transfers
between the parties.100 New York allows partners to have a right of
succession in public housing.101 The City of Los Angeles provides
survivor pensions for surviving partners of deceased employees.102 In
Sacramento, domestic partners are given authority to establish contractual duties between the parties in writing.103 The term “family” in
real estate documents in Sacramento is also defined to include domestic partners.104
E. Termination
The most common provision in domestic partnership statutes
provides for termination upon the death of one of the parties or by a
statement or affidavit filed with the clerk.105 Tempe requires a stateCODE § 2.210.080 (1999); NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-244; PIMA COUNTY MERIT POLICIES
§ 7-106; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.070; SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 4.30.010
(1989).
99. CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.060; PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-63.
100. OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 4.20.050 (2000); PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 19-1405
(2000).
101. NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-244.
102. City
of
Los
Angeles,
Cal.,
Domestic
Partner
Information,
at
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
103. SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.030.
104. Id. § 2.120.060.
105. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170 (2000); Albuquerque, N.M.,
Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures (on file with author); ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE ch.
110, § 9:89 (2001); ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-136 (2000); Berkeley, Cal.,
City
Clerk,
Domestic
Partnership
Information,
at
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf (last visited Sept.,
2001); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-154 (1999); CAMBRIDGE,
MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.030 (1992); Town of Eastchester, N.Y., Town Board Minutes
(Sept. 9, 2000) (on file with author); IOWA CITY, IOWA, CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-4 (1994); ITHACA,
N.Y., CODE § 215-22 (2000); KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.33 (1998);
KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 3.12.044 (1998); LAGUNA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE §
1.12.010 (1992); City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at
http://www.cityoflaw.org; LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 2.210.030 (1999);
MADISON, WIS., MUN. CODE § 3.23(10)(d) (1998); MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE §
6.88.040 (1993); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.60 (1991);
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999); MULTNOMAH
COUNTY, OR., ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 (2000); NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3242; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; Petaluma, Cal., City Council, Minutes of Regular Meeting,
at http://www.ci.petaluma.ca.us (last visited Mar. 10, 2001); PROVINCETOWN, MASS.,
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ment to its Human Resources Department.106 Philadelphia requires a
statement to the Commission on Human Relations.107 Some
municipalities presumably require a statement to the person with
whom the partnership was registered.108 Six of the municipalities
provide for termination if one of the parties marries.109 If the parties
end their cohabitation, the partnership terminates in four
jurisdictions.110 A partnership can be terminated if one party gives
notice to the other partner in six jurisdictions.111 In another five
municipalities, a change in the circumstances that initially justified
the partnership suffices to terminate it.112
F. Policies Toward Private Employers
Only San Francisco requires that all private employers who contract with the jurisdiction offer domestic partnership benefits to their
employees.113 Sacramento’s law requires private employers to allow
family leave for domestic partners if they allow such leave for married

GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-3-3 (1998); ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE § 47B-2 (2000); SACRAMENTO
MUN. CODE § 2.120.040; SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 62.4 (1990); SANTA
BARBARA, CAL., COUNTY CODE § 42-3 (2001); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 4.30.030
(1989); Tempe, Ariz., Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at
http://www.tempe.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2001); City of Tumwater, Wash., Facts About
Domestic Partnership Registration, at http://www.oly-wa.net/tumwater (last visited Mar. 10,
2001); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.84.020 (1998).
106. Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at http://www.tempe.gov.
107. PHILADELPHIA CODE § 9-1106.
108. These are the ordinances of Eastchester, Northampton, Santa Monica, and Pima
County.
109. ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:89; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES §
16½-154;
City
of
Los
Angeles,
Domestic
Partner
Information,
at
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.040; NEW YORK
CITY CODE § 3-242; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.4.
110. City
of
Los
Angeles,
Domestic
Partner
Information,
at
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.040;
SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.040; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.4.
111. ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-136 (2000); ITHACA, N.Y., CODE §
215-22 (2000); City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE §
2.210.030 (1999); MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.040; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE §
2.120.040; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.4.
112. Albuquerque, N.M., Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures (on file with author);
ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-136; IOWA CITY, IOWA, CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-4 (1994);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.60 (1991); MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-19 (1999).
113. SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 12B-1.
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spouses.114
G. Recognition of “Foreign” Domestic Partners
Four jurisdictions provide that domestic partnerships registered
in another place will be recognized in those jurisdictions.115 By contrast, ten municipalities require that at least one partner be a resident
or employee of the jurisdiction.116 The recognition or nonrecognition of partnerships registered in other jurisdictions is important because parties to a domestic partnership may want to assert rights
based on their status as partners when they move from the jurisdiction in which their partnership was registered. Where there is provision for “foreign” recognition, partners may be able to do so. Where
there is not such provision, individuals cannot assert rights based on
their status as partners, but it is not unlikely that the refusal of one
jurisdiction to recognize a domestic partnership from another would
lead to litigation.
H. Other Provisions
A number of municipalities require that once a domestic partnership has been terminated, the partners must wait six months (or
sometimes a shorter period) before entering another partnership (although exception is sometimes made where the termination occurs
due to the death of one of the partners).117 Provincetown and Sacramento have provisions that forbid discrimination on the basis of
domestic partnerships, but the Sacramento law specifies that it is to
114. SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.070.
115. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.090 (1992); KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 72.36 (1998); OAKLAND, CAL., CITY CODE § 4.20.050 (2000) (requiring the
partnership to have been in effect for a year before recognition is sought); WEST HOLLYWOOD,
CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.84.100 (1998).
116. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153 (1999); IOWA CITY
CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-3; KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 3.12.010 (1998); MARIN COUNTY
CODE § 6.88.030; MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.40; NEW YORK CITY, N.Y.,
CODE § 3-241 (2000); SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.020; SAN FRANCISCO MUN.
CODE § 62.3; SANTA BARBARA, CAL., COUNTY CODE § 42-2 (2001); City of Tumwater,
Wash., Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at http://www.olywa.net/tum-water
(last visited Mar. 10, 2001).
117. IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-4; ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 215-22 (2000); KEY WEST,
FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.33 (1998); City of Los Angeles, Cal., Domestic Partner Information, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001); MARIN
COUNTY CODE § 6.88.030; MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OR., ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No.
948 (2000); SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.020; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.3.
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be enforced by private action.118 In San Francisco, a domestic partnership ceremony can be performed.119 Santa Barbara County provides that a domestic partnership cannot be the basis for a cause of
action.120 Seattle does not allow domestic partners to claim a right to
the retirement benefits of their partners.121 In Tempe, the domestic
partnership only lasts twelve months before it must be registered
again.122
IV. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROPOSAL
Chapter 6 of the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution (“Principles”) recommends that certain rights
be made available to unmarried couples upon the dissolution of their
relationship. This chapter defines “domestic partners” as “two persons of the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who
for a significant period of time share a primary residence and a life
together as a couple.”123 The Principles would give credence to registration under a municipal or state domestic partnership law in determining whether to invoke its provisions on dissolution of the relationship.124 Perhaps most startling in this proposal is the fact that a
couple can establish a domestic partnership even if one of the parties
is married to someone else or if the relationship would have been incestuous had it been a marriage!125 The Principles would provide to
domestic partners many of the rights associated with divorce, including concepts analogous to marital property, property division, and
alimony.126
In some ways, the ALI proposal does not resemble the domestic

118. PROVINCETOWN, MASS., GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-7 (1998); SACRAMENTO MUN.
CODE § 2.120.100.
119. SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.9. The ceremony can be performed by the
County Clerk or any person who can perform a marriage under California law. Id.
120. SANTA BARBARA COUNTY CODE § 42-7.
121. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 4.36.185 (1999).
122. Tempe, Ariz., Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at
http://www.tempe.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
123. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 19, § 6.01(1); see also id. § 6.03(1).
124. Id. § 6.03(7)(j).
125. Id. § 6.01(5); id. cmts. c, d; id. § 6.03(7)(k); id. cmt d. The Principles do contain a
caveat that the claims of a domestic partnership should not compromise the marital claims of
the spouse of the married partner, which alleviates some potential economic harm to the
spouse but sends a novel message about the law’s view of adultery.
126. Id. §§ 6.04–.06.
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partnership ordinances now in existence. This is true largely because
of the different context of the ALI proposal and the existing domestic partnership ordinances. The Principles deal with the dissolution of
a relationship and impose on that relationship a status that the parties may or may not have intended. The ordinances, on the other
hand, provide an opportunity for couples to opt into a status. The
Principles do not create a way to formalize a relationship and do not
offer benefits to the couple during the existence of the relationship.
Thus, while the existing ordinances do not create any ramifications
for termination, that is the sole purpose of the ALI proposal.
Despite the differences between the ALI proposal and the existing domestic partnership ordinances, there are some significant similarities, particularly in the definitions of a domestic partnership. Both
the Principles and the municipal ordinances limit a partnership to
two persons. As with the majority of ordinances, the ALI proposal
allows for both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to be recognized
as domestic partners. Lastly, like the majority of municipal laws, the
Principles require the partners to live together.127
V. CRITIQUE
There are significant concerns raised by the domestic partnership
laws discussed above. This section will briefly address two categories
of potential problems with the various laws and the ALI proposal:
legal problems and public policy problems.
A. Legal Issues
Domestic partnership laws have been the subject of significant
litigation, involving three kinds of scenarios: (1) businesses seeking
clarification of ordinances, which raises preemption concerns, (2) taxpayers challenging the laws, which raises authority concerns, and (3)
attempts to have benefits mandated, which raises concerns about
constitutional interpretation. There are also some other significant
legal issues that have not yet been litigated but which will be addressed below.
1. Preemption and regulation concerns
The questions raised in the litigation by businesses have involved
127. Id. § 6.03(2).
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a state’s or municipality’s authority to regulate the behavior of private employers. For instance, in July 1997, five employers challenged
the Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries legislation, claiming that if the law
were interpreted broadly, it would conflict with the federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).128 U.S. District Judge
David Ezra ruled that the law did not cover health maintenance organizations or mutual benefit societies, the subjects of the lawsuit,
and left open the question of the law’s application to companies that
contract with insurance companies.129
Similar issues were raised in litigation involving the San Francisco
domestic partnership ordinance, which prohibited the city from contracting with companies that do not provide domestic partnership
benefits to their employees’ partners equivalent to those offered to
their employees’ spouses. Two airline trade organizations and Federal Express, all of which do business with the city through the San
Francisco airport, filed suit, challenging the requirement that they
offer domestic partnership benefits to their employees.130 Among
plaintiffs’ arguments were a number of issues related to the regulation of private employers, asserting that: (1) the ordinance violated
the U.S. Constitution by regulating out-of-state conduct, (2) the
ordinance was preempted by ERISA, (3) the ordinance was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), and (4) the ordinance was preempted by the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”).131 In that
case, the court held that the ordinance unconstitutionally restricted
interstate commerce to the extent that it applied to out-of-state conduct, thus significantly limiting the ordinance’s effect on the business
of the airlines. The court did not, however, strike down the ordinance altogether.132 Like the Hawaii case, the court held that the ordinance was preempted by ERISA, except as to benefits not covered
by ERISA (i.e., moving expenses and travel benefits), so the ordinance could not govern family medical and bereavement leave and
health and pension benefits.133 The court held that the ordinance
could not withstand the ADA challenge inasmuch as it “is applied in
a manner that creates coercive economic incentives for air carriers to
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

980

See Coolidge, supra note 15, at 274–75 n.246.
Id.
Air Transp. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1162–64.
Id. at 1180.
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alter their routes,”134 but to the degree the ordinance did not do so,
it was valid.135 On the RLA claim, the court held that because the
ordinance acts as a bar on employer conduct regardless of union
status of its employees, it does not affect collective bargaining
agreements.136 Thus, the ordinance was severely limited, though not
killed outright.137
2. Authority concerns
Since localities are legally creatures of the state, a locality needs
state authority to pass an ordinance.138 Usually this authority is
broad, but some state governments do not freely share power with
their municipalities. In a number of states, taxpayers have filed suit,
arguing that a locality did not have the authority to pass a domestic
partnership ordinance. These suits have led to mixed results.
In Minneapolis, taxpayers challenged the city’s adoption of an
ordinance offering domestic partnership benefits to city employees.139 The court of appeals held that the state benefits statute limits
the class of persons to whom municipalities may offer benefits. It further concluded that domestic partners were outside the statutory
limitation, that the extension of benefits was an issue of statewide
concern, as was the matter of discrimination, and that because the
city’s power was purely local, the ordinance was invalid.140 In a similar challenge to a policy of Arlington County, Virginia, the Virginia
Supreme Court held that the Dillon Rule, which allows municipalities to exercise only the powers expressly granted by the State Legislature, was properly interpreted by the Virginia Attorney General in
1997 to prohibit the extension of benefits to “domestic partners.”
Central to the court’s holding was the finding that “domestic partners” are not “dependents” as that term is used in the Virginia statute defining municipalities’ power regarding the extension of insur-

134. Id. at 1188.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1190.
137. In May 1999, the court revisited this case, but the ordinance survived unchanged
from the previous ruling. Air Transp. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, No. 97-01763 CW (May
27, 1999); see also S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. 97-04463 CW (May 27,
1999) (reiterating some of the holdings of these cases).
138. See Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2000).
139. Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
140. Id. at 111–13.
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ance benefits to employees.141 The majority concluded that the General Assembly contemplated that some financial dependence must be
established to allow benefits to be extended, but that the Arlington
County policy did not rely exclusively on financial dependence and,
thus, went beyond the power the County could legitimately exercise.142
In an Illinois case, however, the court rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to a Chicago domestic partnership claim, holding that a domestic partnership statute was not a marital statute, but rather an insurance law that could be validly enacted by the city as long as it was
not expressly preempted by state law.143 A number of other legal challenges have similarly resulted in ordinances being upheld.144
3. State constitutional concerns
The lawsuits attempting to mandate domestic partnership benefits through the courts have raised significant issues of state constitutional interpretation. These cases raise the question of whether limiting employment benefits to married couples violates state equal
protection guarantees by discriminating based on the sex or “sexual
orientation” of unmarried persons.
In California, an employee challenged the denial of dental benefits to his partner by the State Department of Personnel Administration, arguing that the term “spouse,” which was used to determine

141. Arlington County, 528 S.E.2d at 708–09.
142. Id. at 709. Three concurring and dissenting justices agreed that the County had
violated the Dillon Rule but argued that the majority had missed the “fundamental issue”—
whether the County could confer recognition on common law marriages or “same-sex unions.” They characterized the fundamental flaw in the County’s policy as follows: “The
County’s expanded definition of eligible dependents is nothing more than a disguised effort to
confer health benefits upon persons who are involved in either common law marriages or
‘same-sex unions,’ which are not recognized in this Commonwealth and are violative of the
public policy of this Commonwealth.” Id. at 713 (Hassell, J., concurring and dissenting).
143. Crawford v. Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
144. Schaefer v. Denver, 973 P.2d 717, 718–19 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied,
(Colo. 1999); Slattery v. New York, 686 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1999); Atlanta v. Morgan,
492 S.E.2d 193, 194 (Ga. 1997); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000); Arthur H. Rotstein, Judge OKs Benefits for Partners, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, March 15,
1998, at B3; Anne Blythe, Court Upholds Towns’ Domestic-Partners Laws, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, NC), May 9, 2000, at B5; Jacks v. Santa Barbara, available at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/cases/record?-record=83>; Jo Becker, Domestic
Partner Policy Expanded in Montgomery, WASH. POST, June 27, 2001, at B1; Judge Upholds
City’s Domestic-Partner Benefits, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at 6B.
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to whom benefits were available, was a classification based on sexual
orientation and should therefore be viewed as suspect under California’s equal protection clause.145 Explaining that the department policy distinguished solely between married and unmarried employees
rather than between heterosexual and homosexual employees, the
court failed to identify “any classification at all which is the subject of
discrimination.”146 The court also noted that it was “unable to establish the nature of a homosexual ‘family’ on the basis of any natural,
intrinsic or legal foundation.”147 Since the class of unmarried persons
was not suspect, statutory distinctions based upon marital status
needed only to be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
Citing the state’s “legitimate interest in promoting marriage,” the
court rejected the discrimination claim, stating that “[t]he state’s
public policy favoring marriage is promoted by conferring statutory
rights upon married persons which are not afforded unmarried partners.”148
In Wisconsin, the State Personnel Commission dismissed an employee’s discrimination complaint based on an administrative denial
of her request for family health insurance coverage for her partner.149
Her claim, based on a state discrimination statute and the Wisconsin
constitution, was also denied by the trial court, which affirmed the
Commission’s decision.150 The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the decision not to extend benefits did not rely on a classification based on gender or sexual orientation, but rather on marital
status, so there was no constitutional claim.151
In Colorado, an employee challenged a decision by the state Career Services Board to deny her sick leave to take care of her domestic partner. The decision was based on an administrative rule that allowed for sick leave only to care for a member of the employee’s
“immediate family.”152 The plaintiff claimed that because the rule’s
definition of “immediate family” did not include a same-sex partner,

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
1994).

Hinman v. Dep’t of Pers. Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 524 (Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 526.
Id.
Id. at 527.
Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
Id.
Id. at 129.
Ross v. Denver Dep’t of Health and Hosp., 883 P.2d 516, 518 (Colo. Ct. App.
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the law created a classification of persons who are denied sick leave
benefits on the basis of sexual orientation, thus violating the Colorado Constitution.153 The court held that the rule in question did
not differentiate between heterosexual and homosexual employees
but rather between married and unmarried employees:
Ross was not denied family sick leave benefits to care for her
same-sex partner because she is homosexual. An unmarried heterosexual employee also would not be permitted to take family sick
leave benefits to care for his or her unmarried opposite-sex partner.
Thus, the rule does not treat homosexual employees and similarly
situated heterosexual employees differently.154

Therefore, there was no violation of the State constitution.155
Recently, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court ruling that public employers who offer spousal benefits to employees
must
provide
domestic
partnership
benefits
to
homosexual persons meeting certain requirements. In order to qualify, the employees must not be related by blood or be closer in degree of relationship than first cousins. They must not have been legally married and must have continuously lived together in an
exclusive and loving relationship that they intend to maintain for the
rest of their lives. They must share financial responsibilities and
demonstrate that they would be married to each other if Oregon law
permitted it. They must not have other domestic partners, and, finally, must be eighteen years of age or older.156
In the section of the opinion regarding Oregon constitutional
law, the court applied a two-step analysis to determine, first, whether
the plaintiffs were part of a “true class” and, second, whether they
were part of a “suspect class.” Same-sex couples are clearly “defined
in terms of ad hominem, personal and social characteristics,” so to
the court, they are a “true class.”157 In other words, their identity as

153. Id. at 518.
154. Id. at 520.
155. Id. at 521. The court also noted that the underlying claim was that the marriage law
was unfair but noted that the decision to change that law must be left to the legislature. Id. at
520.
156. Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 439 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). For more
on this case, see David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Marriage and Democracy in
Oregon: The Meaning and Implications of Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 36
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 503 (2000).
157. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 447.
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a class is not an artificial legal construct, but is something that exists
outside the structure of legal classifications.158
The court then analyzed whether or not the class was a suspect
class. The court held that there was no requirement of an immutable
trait (or traits) to establish a suspect class, adopting instead the standard that the class must have characteristics that have been “historically regarded as defining distinct, socially-recognized groups that
have been the subject of adverse social or political stereotyping or
prejudice.”159 The court then held that homosexuals are subject to
stereotyping and prejudice, so they are a suspect class.160 The court
could find no valid justification for the denial of domestic partnership benefits, and, since same-sex couples cannot marry, the court
found that the policy was discriminatory.161
4. Other issues
Three legal issues related to domestic partnership laws have not
yet been litigated: the effect of such laws on marriage law, the effect
of the laws on religious freedom, and the effect of the laws on democratic self-government.
a. Marriage. The most significant legal concern regarding domestic partner benefits is the effect of the extension of these benefits
on marriage law. If a court (such as in Tanner162) finds these benefits
constitutionally required, it would not seem to be a large inferential
leap to say that marriage status is also constitutionally required for
same-sex couples.163 The essential claim would be: If same-sex couples have all the benefits of marriage, why not the title? In a less direct way, recognizing same-sex relationships sets a precedent for ei-

158. Id. at 445.
159. Id. at 446.
160. Id. at 447.
161. Id. at 448. The practical effect of this remarkable ruling is not yet clear. The State of
Oregon chose not to appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court. In an unusual (but not unprecedented) procedural move, an Oregon state legislator sought a writ of mandamus to compel the
state to appeal the ruling in order to defend the current state of the law. State ex rel. Sunseri v.
Court of Appeals, No. 46055, 1999 Ore. LEXIS 116 (Or. Mar. 2, 1999). The petition for the
writ, however, was denied by the Oregon Supreme Court.
162. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
163. In the Tanner case, the Oregon Court of Appeals specifically declined to address the
constitutionality of the Oregon marriage statute, but it is not hard to imagine that if same-sex
couples are a suspect class, then denying them marriage rights would likely come under exacting scrutiny. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 443 n.3.
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ther (1) recognition of “sexual orientation” as a constitutionally recognized class, or (2) recognition of same-sex relationships as equivalent to marriage. In other words, even if domestic partnerships are
not constitutionally mandated, they may lead to a rethinking of constitutional requirements in these two areas.
b. Religious liberty. When domestic partnership laws include provisions for forcing non-government employers to offer benefits, religious freedom concerns are also implicated. This possibility would
arise where a religious organization or religious individual is an employer and objects on moral grounds to offering domestic partnership benefits. Some religious organizations would decline to hire
someone with a domestic partner or would decline to provide that
employee the equivalent of spousal benefits if they subsequently
learned that he or she had a domestic partner. In addition, while a
religiously motivated person who is a private “secular” employer may
feel that the personal choices of his or her employee are not an employment issue, that employer may still be hesitant to support these
choices by offering benefits. If forbidden to make this judgment, individuals (or organizations) may be denied the opportunity to act on
their beliefs regarding the immorality of nonmarital sexual relationships.164
c. Democracy. The cases seeking to compel recognition of domestic partnerships through novel constitutional interpretations also
raise serious issues for constitutional self-government. In the Tanner
case, for instance, the court of appeals (1) held that Oregon’s sexdiscrimination law prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, (2) created and defined a status of domestic partners to
whom public employers were ordered to offer benefits, and (3) held
that distinctions between married couples and unmarried same-sex

164. An analogous situation has arisen in a number of states where private individuals
have been unwilling to rent to unmarried couples based on their religious conviction that doing so would violate their religious beliefs related to sexual morality. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996) (requiring landlord to rent to unmarried couple despite religious objections to nonmarital sexual relationships does not violate state
constitution’s free exercise clause); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d
274 (Alaska 1994) (same result); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994)
(holding that requirement that landlord rent to unmarried couple in violation of conscience
substantially burdens free exercise under state constitution); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2
(Minn. 1990) (concluding that the Minnesota Constitution’s freedom of conscience provision
outweighed state interest in preventing marital status discrimination in housing).
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couples are constitutionally forbidden.165 In the case of the first and
third issues, the Oregon Legislature had grappled with the issues but
had not been able to resolve them. Regarding the second issue, although creating and defining the status of domestic partners was
clearly a legislative function, the trial court created such a status
without any outside legal support.166 This attempt to circumvent the
normal legislative process is dangerous because it threatens to undermine the structure of state governments when one branch imposes on the province of another. It also threatens to undermine the
legitimacy of the court as citizens sense that the court has overstepped its constitutional authority.
B. Public Policy Concerns167
Serious policy considerations of domestic partnership laws derive
from the underlying nature of domestic partnerships.
The crucial element of domestic partnerships is not the fact that
they allow unmarried couples to gain some of the benefits of marriage. Marriage is not about benefits. In fact, marriage law has always
begun with a recognition of its uniqueness as a status—a union between a man and a woman. This uniqueness makes marriage particularly well suited to advance certain goals. These include procreation
(since a sexual relationship between a man and a woman is the only
context in which procreation can take place naturally) and childrearing (because the commitment between parents in a marriage
makes it more likely that children will be raised in a stable environment where they are guaranteed both a mother and father). Marriage
between a man and a woman also provides protection to women and
children from men who would take advantage of women sexually
without being willing to make a commitment to either the woman
or any children that result from their relationship.168 Recognizing the
165. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 442–44.
166. Even in Vermont, where the supreme court held that the state constitution required
the extension of marital benefits to same-sex couples, the court held that creating the mechanism to extend the benefits was a legislative function. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.
1999).
167. For the most part, these criticisms apply most directly to the municipal ordinances I
have discussed and only by extension to the Principles. For a more thorough critique of the
Principles, see Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s “Domestic Partners” Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189.
168. Parenthetically, it should be noted that marriage is different from both same-sex
relationships in which any sexual relationship cannot result in procreation and different from
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value of marriage to society, the state provides a package of benefits
to those who marry.169
The concept of domestic partnership seems to work the other
way, recognizing that some people do not receive marital benefits,
and trying to create a status that can then be used for identifying
where the benefits ought to go.170 It is really a functional redefinition
of marriage—one in which the status of marriage is separated from
the benefits afforded it. Those benefits are meted out to other relationships which seem to fulfill some of the same functions as marriage (such as economic interdependency, commitment, etc.).171 It is
interesting to note that the definitional parameters of the domestic
partnership laws are very similar to marriage (sometimes even making
reference to marriage) but are still significantly broader in their scope
by employing nebulous requirements such as “caring and commitment.”172
In upending the normal understanding of family law, which accorded marriage a privileged status because of its unique contribution, these ordinances shift the burden from individuals to show that
they deserve benefits because they have entered a status beneficial to
society and to the state. Instead, the state is now required to justify
its decision not to give benefits to any two people who feel committed to each other for an indeterminate amount of time.
Still, the focus of the laws is not benefits. If it were, why would
relatives be excluded? Certainly there are adult children of elderly
parents who would benefit from being able to designate their parents
as dependents. The answer is obvious—the intention is not to give
out benefits; there are other ways to do that. The point is to create a
status that serves as a parallel to marriage but which is inclusive of

opposite-sex cohabiting relationships in which the parties may have children as a result of a
sexual relationship but do not have the inherent stability that marriage provides. In addition,
the vulnerability experienced by a woman in a relationship with a man. In a homosexual relationship, even though they may raise children together, their sexual relations cannot result in
procreation; in such a relationship, it requires a willful decision to introduce children into the
relationship.
169. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983).
170. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 16½-151 (1999); SANTA MONICA,
CAL., CODE § 4.60.010 (1995).
171. See William C. Duncan, “Don’t Ever Take a Fence Down”: The “Functional” Definition of Family—Displacing Marriage in Family Law, 3 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 57 (2001).
172. See supra notes 82–93 and accompanying text.
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those who are not married. The implications of the creation of domestic partnership status are serious and troubling. Even in the ALI
proposal, where relatives can be domestic partners, the language
used is “share . . . life together as a couple.”173 It seems very unlikely
that a parent and child would recognize their relationship as “li[ving]
together as a couple.” In addition, the ALI’s placement of its recognition of domestic partnerships in the Principles indicates its understanding of domestic partnerships as a type of “functional family” relationship.
Given the ability of unmarried couples to approximate the status
of marriage through private agreements or by use of other laws,174
one of the few benefits historically tied to marriage that still seems to
be exclusive to marriage is the making licit of a sexual relationship—
that is, sending a message that society considers the marriage relationship to be the only appropriate context for sexual relations. Domestic partnerships send the opposite message; particularly where
there is a requirement of “intimacy,” domestic partnership laws provide legal and societal sanction to nonmarital sexual relationships.175
They send a message that participating in nonmarital relationships is
as valid a choice as the choice to be married. As one advocate of domestic partner benefits put it, “The recognition of domestic partnerships also can have a broad societal and legal impact by establishing
the legitimacy and acceptability of same-sex relationships.”176 In fact,
this is the stated goal of many of the ordinances examined above.177
In the case of the ALI proposal, the message will even include a
statement that adulterous sexual relationships are appropriate.178
In the desire to accommodate the choices people are making, the
ALI ignores another reality—the fact that family law is replete with a
system of incentives and disincentives and that it may choose to provide social disincentives to behavior it finds objectionable. The failure of most state legislatures to provide domestic partnership recog-

173. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 19, § 6.03(1).
174. See HAYDEN CURRY ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES
(1996).
175. See supra notes 82–93 and accompanying text.
176. Lewis Becker, Recognition of Domestic Partnerships by Governmental Entities and
Private Employers, 1 NAT’L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 90, 101, at
http://www.ibiblio.org/gaylaw/issue1/becker.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2001).
177. See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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nition may not be, as the ALI seems to assume, a mere oversight of
existing trends, but a statement that the state wants to discourage extramarital sexual relationships—or at least not to privilege them. This
is surely the case where the ALI allows a married person to have a
domestic partnership with another person to whom he or she is not
married.
Another obvious policy implication of domestic partnership laws
is the effect on the preferred status of marriage in society. Society has
traditionally conferred special benefits only to marriage because of its
unique contribution not only to each participant but to the larger
community.179 These laws create a situation where marriage is considered just one way of organizing society in order to confer benefits.
If marriage is just a convenient way to dispense benefits, domestic
partnerships may be just as appropriate because they arguably provide as convenient a way to decide which relationships are entitled to
economic and societal benefits. When the benefits traditionally reserved for married couples are extended to other couples based on a
nonmarital status, the obvious implication is that the law no longer
considers marriage to be the uniquely valuable institution that it has
been. Again, some of the domestic partnership ordinances admit as
much with their invocation of the “changing nature of the family”
and their references to multiple, equally valid family forms.180 As Professor William Eskridge has noted, if marriage becomes only one
more option, like a flavor of ice cream, its social position will eventually be undermined. According to Eskridge, “experimental laws like
Vermont’s will undermine the institution of marriage [and] . . . , [i]n
the long run, they threaten to make marriage obsolete.”181 In the
past, couples who wanted to ensure the legitimacy of offspring, the
licitness of sexuality, etc., had to marry. With the growing acceptance
of alternative statuses, couples are able to choose the type of legal
recognition they want for their relationship. Coupled with the parceling out of marital benefits to these other statuses, the draw of
marriage could be severely weakened as couples are enticed to enter
into other, less demanding legal obligations.
Another challenge raised by domestic partnership laws is the ap-

179. See Hafen, supra note 169.
180. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
181. William Eskridge, Jr., The Emerging Menu of Quasi-Marriage Options, at
http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20000707_eskridge.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2001).
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propriate limitations on the relationships recognized by the law. Currently, most of the ordinances apply only to single individuals, but
the ALI proposal allows for a domestic partnership to exist even if a
party is married to another person.182 If “commitment” or “caring”
are the relevant determinants for establishing a domestic partnership,183 why should the incest prohibitions be included? Why, for
that matter, should there be a limitation on the numbers of individuals involved? It has been argued that such limitations should not exist.184
Finally, a domestic partner relationship has the potential of binding individuals in a relationship that can never be a marriage and that
can never contribute what a marriage could to the happiness of the
partners or to the good of society.185 One such benefit is stability.
Domestic partnership ordinances almost always allow for a quick dissolution of the relationship.186 Thus, while the partnership creates an
impression that a marriage-like relationship is involved, this impression is really an illusion because the relationship, along with its benefits and obligations, can usually be ended with extremely little effort.
Research indicates that “the break-up rate of cohabitators is far
higher than for married partners.”187 In addition, in a very realistic
way, the legal sanction of cohabitation may tie partners in a destructive relationship. A recent report from The National Marriage Project at Rutgers University noted that “[l]iving together outside of
marriage increases the risk of domestic violence for women, and the

182. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 82–93 and accompanying text.
184. Cf. David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 490–91 (1996) (arguing that
because a limit on the number of partners is rather arbitrary, “the law ought to be . . . the same
for units of more than two”).
185. “[M]arried persons, both men and women, are on average considerably better off
than all categories of unmarried persons (never-married, divorced, separated, and widowed) in
terms of happiness, satisfaction, physical health, longevity, and most aspects of emotional
health.” INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, CLOSED HEARTS, CLOSED MINDS: THE
TEXTBOOK STORY OF MARRIAGE 10 (1997). This report also indicates that the benefits of
marriage are not likely to accrue in cohabitation arrangements. Id. at 11. See also, generally,
MAGGIE GALLAGHER & LINDA WAITE, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE (2000).
186. See supra notes 105–12 and accompanying text.
187. DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, SHOULD WE LIVE TOGETHER?
WHAT YOUNG ADULTS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT COHABITATION BEFORE MARRIAGE: A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF RECENT RESEARCH 6 (1999).
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risk of physical and sexual abuse for children.”188 Finally, children
raised by cohabitating adults are at greater risk of harm from parental
break-up, abuse, and poverty.189
There are certainly other problems with these types of laws and
proposals that others will have noted. So far, there has been no significant pro and con discussion of the legal or policy implications of
domestic partnerships. Surely that should be a prerequisite to the
creation of such a novel legal status or of its being proposed as part
of a uniform family law system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law related to domestic partnerships seems to be a growth
industry, although the number of jurisdictions which have adopted
laws providing for such a status is still relatively small. With the
promulgation of the ALI Principles, the matter may soon move to
the forefront of family law issues and so must be examined with care.
This article has attempted to provide some of that examination by
surveying the current state of the law regarding domestic partnerships. It has also attempted to address a few of the serious and
weighty issues raised by the adoption of such laws. The legal, philosophical, and public policy problems inherent in the legal recognition of a new status for domestic partners caution against adoption
of such laws; at the very least, the problems should give a state or local legislative body pause before endorsing such a scheme. At a time
when marriage is under threat on many fronts, it behooves policy
makers to ask themselves whether the decisions they make will
strengthen or further erode this institution, which has always been
recognized as the basic unit of society and the foundation for the
family. Then policies which threaten marriage, such as the legal recognition of domestic partnership status, should be rejected.

188. Id. at 1.
189. Id. at 8.
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